![]() ![]() Man's awareness of objects is neither merely subjective nor merely objective. Every time the body is affected, so is the soul, because what is affected is the animated or besouled body. To admit a passage from outer to inner world is to fall into the dualism of Ren é descartes. Together body and soul constitute not a union, but a unity, the animated body.Ĭartesian Dualism. The human soul, man's inner world, animates his body. ![]() Through his body, he is part of the outside world, a material object among other material objects and continually influenced by them. There is no real passage -these two worlds unite in man. The problem of the passage from an outside world to an inner world is thus a pseudoproblem. What man knows, therefore, is not simply impressions made upon him by things, but things themselves. To claim that the sense powers reason to the existence of an outside world in this way, however, is quite implausible. On his senses, he would arrive at knowledge of reality only by inference, by reasoning that this impression must be the effect of some external cause and thus applying the principle of causality. He could not even be certain that there is a reality "outside" of himself. He would not know that any impression was a faithful reproduction of the outside world, since, in that hypothesis, he could never be in contact with the outside world. If he knew only the impression, he would forever be cut off from reality. In sensation, therefore, man knows the object itself, and not simply the impression made by the object. An example of a formal sign is the retinal image, or picture of a perceived object on the retina of the eye man never sees the image itself, but through it he sees the object. Formal signs, on the other hand, are not known in themselves, but become the means whereby the signified object is known. Objective signs must be known first in themselves, before the thing they signify can be known examples would be a photograph, a traffic light. ![]() Why do the senses know the object itself, and not simply its substitute, the impressed species? One answer is: because the species is a formal, not an objective, sign. This elementary explanation of sense knowledge raises a number of questions that must now be considered. Only when this occurs is there real knowledge. Hence there is a last stage, the active psychological stage, in which the sense power turns, as it were, toward the object, grasps it, and knows it. Up to this point the sense power can be regarded as passive or receptive. It is a substitute for the outside object within the sense power, by means of which the object becomes known. The result produced is called the impressed species or the impressed intentional form (see species, intentional). Since the organ is living and animated, its physiological modification is accompanied by another, or psychic modification, whose production constitutes the psychological stage. This is followed by a physiological stage, wherein a modification is produced by the stimulus in the sense organ. In the physical stage, an outside stimulus (e.g., electromagnetic or sound waves) originating from some object impinges upon a sense organ. Several stages may be distinguished in the act of sensation. It is best explained, therefore, by first giving a rough outline that can serve as an approximation, and then correcting this on points of specific detail.Īct of Sensation. When simplified it is easily misunderstood, and when presented in its totality, it is difficult and calls for considerable insight. The Thomistic teaching on sensation defies simple, brief presentation. thomas aquinas, and considered in the totality of cognitional experience. This article outlines a philosophical view of sensation, based mainly on the teaching of St. Much of what is traditionally said about sensation, it should be noted, does not strictly apply to simple sensation but rather to sense knowledge or to perception. When someone sees a cat and makes the statement: "That is a cat," he expresses a judgment containing an affirmation, a concept (cat), a perception (being here and now aware of this cat), and a certain number of sensations (e.g., gray, soft, purring). But in man every perception is integrated into a more complex totality, involving the concept and the judgment. Pure perceptions occur in animals, e.g., a dog perceives a cat. The awareness of green, of warm, of sharp -when not accompanied by the awareness of something green, warm, or sharp -is a simple sensation the awareness of a particular green leaf, on the other hand, is not a sensation but a perception. Sensation may be described as the most elementary cognitive reaction of an organism to its environment. ![]()
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |